# COMPLAINT

Against Twitter International Unlimited Company ("X")

Regarding violation of Art. 22(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)

Jointly submitted by Asociația pentru Tehnologie și Internet (ApTI) and European Digital Rights AISBL

#### This submission is set out as follows:

- A. INTRODUCTION
- B. BACKGROUND
- C. EVIDENCE
- D. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
- E. SUGGESTIONS

## This submission is filed with supporting documents containing:

• ANNEX – SCREENSHOTS OF THE 'DIGITAL SERVICES ACT' ONLINE FORM IN THE INVESTIGATED LANGUAGES

#### A. INTRODUCTION

1

We hereby submit a complaint against the platform X, operated by Twitter International Unlimited Company [hereinafter "**X**" shall be understood as referencing the platform itself] regarding violation of Art. 22(1) of the Digital Services Act (**"DSA"**) by wrongly redirecting Trusted Flaggers that are designated under Article 22 DSA to submit notices about infringing content on a nonfunctioning online form in all the platform's EU language versions other than English.<sup>1</sup>

While in decline in recent years, X continues to hold major opinion shaping power in the EU. In 2024, X Corp. generated 2.7 billion USD in revenue and employed around 1,500 staff, according to publicly available figures. In the EU, X operates as Twitter International Unlimited Company based in Ireland and notified 115 million monthly active European users under the DSA.

X is under several ongoing DSA investigations conducted by the European Commission, at least one of which<sup>2</sup> specifically concerns the platform's failure to "counter the dissemination of illegal content in the EU, as well as the functioning of the notice and action mechanism for illegal content in the EU mandated by the DSA, including in light of X's content moderation resources."

Research consistently shows<sup>3,4,5</sup> that the dissemination of illegal and other infringing content on X has surged after changes of internal content moderation policies and practices introduced in the context of the company's acquisition by Elon Musk.

We tested the following language versions: Bulgarian, Croatian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, Gaelic / Irish, German, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> European Commission, "Commission opens formal proceedings against X under the Digital Services Act", Press Release, 18 December 2023, available at <u>https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\_23\_6709</u>, accessed on 11 March 2025.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Daniel Hickey et al., "X under Musk's leadership: Substantial hate and no reduction in inauthentic activity", PLoS ONE 20(2): e0313293, 12 February 2025, available at https://doi.org/10.1371/ journal.pone.0313293, accessed on 11 March 2025.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Michael Jensen, "Hate speech on X surged for at least 8 months after Elon Musk takeover – new research", The Conversation, 12 February 2025, available at https://theconversation.com/hate-speech-on-x-surged-for-at-least-8-months-after-elonmusk-takeover-new-research-249603, accessed on 11 March 2025.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Gitar Johar, Yu Ding, "Elon Musk Has Turned X (Twitter) into a Free-for-All — and Here's the Proof", Columbia Business School, 13 February 2024, available at https://business.columbia.edu/insights/digital-future/opinion-elon-musk-has-turned-xtwitter-free-all-and-heres-proof, accessed on 11 March 2025.

#### B. BACKGROUND

X provides a 'Digital Services Act' online form enabling an individual or an entity to "notify us about content that is illegal under EU law or under the national law of an EU member state, in compliance with Union law."<sup>6</sup> The online form is available is various languages.

The form allows notifying parties to submit a name and email address and asks for information about the username or account handle to be reported. Notifying parties are also required to select the jurisdiction in which the account has violated a law, as well as legal reasons for the notice, such as "Illegal or harmful speech", "Protection of minors" or "Violence". An optional text field allows notifying parties to provide information "about what's happening."

While this online form is generally available to all individuals and entities, the introductory text above the form in English explains that "Entities carrying Trusted Flaggers status per Article 22 of DSA and designated NGOs will be recognized by their email used when submitting the report below." Trusted Flaggers must therefore use the same online form to submit Article 16 notices as everybody else, but X says it is able to distinguish their notices from others by their email address, presumably the professional domain name.

While the above describes the content of the form's English language version, all other EU language versions feature entirely different text for Trusted Flaggers. The language versions we tested all explicitly tell Trusted Flaggers to *not* use the 'Digital Services Act' online form but instead go to X's 'Legal Enquiries' page at <a href="https://t.co/lr">https://t.co/lr</a> (which redirects to <a href="https://t.co/lr">https://t.co/lr</a> (be the tested flaggers. The language versions we tested all explicitly tell Trusted Flaggers to <a href="https://t.co/lr">not</a> (be the tested flaggers to <a href="https://t.co/lr">not</a> (be the tested flaggers to <a href="https://t.co/lr">https://t.co/lr</a> (be tested flaggers) to submit their Article flaggers) to submit the flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers) flaggers tested flaggers</a> (be tested flaggers) to submit the flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers) tested flaggers</a> (be tested flaggers) tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers</a> (be tested flaggers) tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers tested flaggers</a> (be tested flaggers tested flaggers) tested flaggers tested flag

The 'Legal Enquiries' page, however, explicitly states that it is only meant to be used for "legal requests" by law enforcement agents, government officials, or other unspecified third-parties. It threatens any "unauthorized access or prohibited use" of the page with prosecution,<sup>7</sup> and thereby strongly discourages anyone else, including Trusted Flaggers, from using it. The page does not contain any reference to Trusted Flaggers in any of the languages we tested.

Our tests also revealed that the 'Legal Enquiries' page in fact does not work for Trusted Flaggers.

X Digital Services Act form available at <a href="https://help.x.com/en/forms/dsa/report">https://help.x.com/en/forms/dsa/report</a>, last accessed on 10 March 2025.
X Logal request submissions form available at <a href="https://logalrequests.twitter.com/forms/">https://logalrequests.twitter.com/forms/</a>, last

X Legal request submissions form available at <u>https://legalrequests.twitter.com/forms/</u> landing\_disclaimer, last accessed on 10 March 2025.

#### C. EVIDENCE

In order to show the difference between the English version, which refers to the correct Trusted Flagger form, and all other language versions that do not, we have systematically verified and created screenshots of the pages concerned, namely in the EU languages Bulgarian, Croatian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, Gaelic / Irish, German, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish. All screenshots are listed in the Annex of this complaint.

In order to test the functionality—and therefore compliance with Article 22(1) DSA—of the 'Legal Enquiries' page to which Trusted Flaggers are being redirected in the above languages, we worked with Trusted Flaggers in Finland<sup>8</sup>, Greece<sup>9</sup>, and a third EU member state<sup>10</sup> to assess whether Trusted Flaggers could alternatively use the 'Legal Enquiries' page to submit their notices.

The organisations we ran those tests with have all been properly awarded the Trusted Flagger status under Article 22 DSA by their respective Digital Services Coordinators. In all tests they were using their professional email addresses as sender address in X's 'Legal Enquiries' online form.

We found that in all three sample countries the 'Legal Enquiries' page failed to accept any of our partners' attempts to submit an Article 16 notice as Trusted Flagger. Their email addresses were not recognised by X and instead their attempt was met with the following error message:

"Please enter a valid law enforcement email address. For general inquiries, see https://help.twitter.com/forms/lawenforcement"

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|---|--|---|
| y Legal Requests  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |  |   |
| Legal request submissions<br>Please confirm your identity |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |  |   |
|   | Please enter a valid law enforcement email address. For general inquiries, see<br>https://help.twitter.com/forms/lawenforcement |   |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |  |   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Pelastakaa Lapset ry, Koskelantie 38, Helsinki, 00601, Finland.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Disinformation Observatory 'Greece Fact Check', Provincial road Nafpaktou Platanou, Ναύπακτος (Nafpaktos), 30300, Greece.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The third Trusted Flagger requested to remain unnamed in order to not jeopardise its relationship with the online platform.

#### D. LEGAL ASSESSMENT

The above described pages for Trusted Flaggers and the way those pages are misleading them to submit notices through a wrong, non-functional online form constitute an infringement of Art. 22(1) DSA.

Pursuant to Art. 22(1) DSA, providers of online platforms shall take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers, acting within their designated area of expertise, through the mechanisms referred to in Article 16, are given priority and are processed and decided upon without undue delay.

While complainants have not tested whether X has or has not taken the necessary technical and organisational steps to process notices from Trusted Flaggers in English with priority, we have shown that X discourages and misleads Trusted Flaggers in all other tested languages by redirecting them to a wrong, nonfunctioning online form.

Complainants have reached out to X by email on 17 February 2025, requesting the company to make the necessary changes to the various language versions in order to be in compliance with the company's obligations under the DSA no later than 3 March 2025.


While complainants received a friendly response from X, claiming this was an "important issue" and promising to "share the information with the relevant teams so they can investigate further," nothing actually changed. To this day, non-English Trusted Flaggers in the EU are still misled to the wrong, nonfunctioning online form.

#### E. SUGGESTIONS

It is suggested that the Coimisiún na Meán initiate proceedings against X and order the cessation of any infringements found pursuant to Art. 51 DSA and, if necessary, combine this with the imposition of a fine.

If deemed helpful to inform their own investigations, it is also suggested that the Coimisiún na Meán shares any evidence collected as part of those proceedings, including the content of this complaint, with the relevant services of the European Commission.

# ANNEX – SCREENSHOTS OF THE 'DIGITAL SERVICES ACT' ONLINE FORM IN THE INVESTIGATED LANGUAGES



# Figure 1: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Bulgarian





Figure 2: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Croatian



# Figure 3: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Danish




Figure 4: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Dutch




Figure 5: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Finnish




Figure 6: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in French




Figure 7: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Gaelic / Irish




Figure 8: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in German




Figure 9: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Hungarian




Figure 10: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Italian





Figure 11: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Latvian



*Figure 12: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Lithuanian* 




Figure 13: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Maltese






Figure 14: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Polish



*Figure 15: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Portuguese* 



*Figure 16: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Romanian* 




Figure 17: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Slovak





Figure 18: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Slovene



## Figure 19: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Spanish




Figure 20: Screenshot of the 'Digital Services Act' form in Swedish