Technologies for border surveillance and control in Italy

This research points out that identification and categorisation systems for migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, rely on vast quantities of biometric data including fingerprints and facial images. It is, however, often difficult to assess how these procedures are managed. Upon identification, the aforementioned groups have limited knowledge and awareness about where and how their personal and biometric data are going to be stored and used, hindering them from countering the pressure that this flow of information puts on their subsequent living conditions in Italy and in the European Union.

By EDRi · February 16, 2022

The documented use of facial recognition systems by the municipal administration of the city of Como, Italy, or by the Italian National Police has sparked a debate about this technology that, in other countries, has already been widely criticised for the inaccuracy of its algorithms and lack of transparency. Already a concern for the general public, the use of facial recognition technology poses particular risks for vulnerable individuals, such as migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. In those cases, data is processed by government agencies for surveillance and control purposes, with subjects enjoying even more limited human rights legal safeguards than European and Italian citizens.

This constitutes an enormous risk for these people: identification procedures upon their arrival in Italy, performed at reception hotspots, can both threaten their stay in Italy (or in Europe) and create a situation of permanent surveillance. Once again, select groups of people are forced to become “guinea pigs” for surveillance and control procedures, reiterating power imbalances through application of technology, and the creation of a two-tier system of people: those who surveil and those who are surveilled.

This research points out that identification and categorisation systems for migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, rely on vast quantities of biometric data including fingerprints and facial images. It is, however, often difficult to assess how these procedures are managed. Upon identification, the aforementioned groups have limited knowledge and awareness about where and how their personal and biometric data are going to be stored and used, hindering them from countering the pressure that this flow of information puts on their subsequent living conditions in Italy and in the European Union.

For several years, the latter has called for more swift identification procedures for migrants, foreigners and asylum-seekers through an unprecedented use of new technologies: the seas are patrolled by remote-controlled drone ships and aircrafts “scanning” incoming arrivals; upon landing, they face, along with compulsory identification and photographic categorisation, the risk of being recorded with “smart” cameras. A large section of this research focuses on the methods of use of facial recognition technology by Italian government agencies, which have not allowed any oversight or monitoring by independent legal professionals or organisations.

Along with the lack of transparency over its core algorithms, no additional information is available on the exact number of people catalogued in the AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) database, used to find facial matches. The Italian National Police had initially intended to use a different facial recognition system, called SARI Real-Time (Sistema Automatico Riconoscimento Immagini i.e. Automatic Image- Hermes Center | Technologies for Border Surveillance and Control in Italy 5 Recognition System), which would allow for real-time identification of migrants on boats upon their landing on Italian ports. The SARI Real-Time system, originally purchased to be employed during protests and public events, was discontinued following a decision by the Italian Data Protection Authority (DPA), who ruled that the system could open the doors to unjustified mass surveillance and that there was no legal basis to deploy it.

The goal of the DPA’s decision was to not only protect people currently residing in Italy, but also those who find themselves in the highly vulnerable situation of landing on Italian shores, only to be subjected to disproportionate monitoring, prior even to receiving medical attention or legal evaluation of their status. Since 2011, our work at the Hermes Centre for Transparency and Digital Human Rights has been focused on investigation of the function, scope and purpose of the latest technological innovations, by analysing them from both a technical and digital human rights standpoint. Over the last few years, the process of society datafication, through an indiscriminate collection of personal data and extraction of valuable information on behaviour and activities, is the main focus of our association’s research, enquiry and advocacy.

We have a core belief that we should question the use of digital technology specifically created for the alleged purpose of fostering progress or providing an objective analysis to complex social phenomena, as well as the idea of technology as a neutral and impartial entity that has roughly similar repercussions over every member of society. It is important for us that any and all conversation about technology should also include broader political and sociological considerations, in the attempt to recognise the difference between those who operate technology and those who are subjected to it.

Key findings

  • The criminalisation of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers is ingrained within the Italian technological infrastructure
  • Migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are obliged to resort to a form of bartering of their personal and biometric data in exchange for reception and information to continue their journey, often towards northern Europe.
  • Migration management and border control policies in Europe are no longer exclusively performed through public policy or traditional border control: identification procedures during disembarking operations or at the time of arrival on the Italian territory are increasingly invasive and tech-intensive.
  • Facial recognition systems used in Italy during criminal investigations could have far more serious consequences on migrants and asylum-seekers, stemming from a lack of publicly-available, independent evaluation on the accuracy of the facial recognition system’s core algorithms used by police.
  • To the Government and the Parliament. For these reasons, we believe in the necessity, for both governments and lawmakers, to intervene in a decisive way on the issue of databases collecting biometric data from people belonging to vulnerable categories, like migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and ensure the information collected is not “diluted” and conflated with information related to the management of databases holding criminal records. Populating a single database with profiles of people who have committed robberies or murders, people in possession of a regular residence permit, along with migrants or asylum-seekers is liable to jeopardize and weaken the basic rights of individuals. People included in the AFIS database are automatically considered suspects and their digital biometric identity is subjected to a search whenever the SARI system is used.
  • To the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior must provide clarifications over the timeframe of data storage in the AFIS database and the way the database is populated, by allowing a thorough analysis performed by the DPA. In order to ensure that these technologies are not used on migrants and foreign nationals in the future, the Ministry should also provide precise details on the algorithms used by the SARI system, by allowing public and independent evaluations on the system’s performance every six months.
  • To Civil Society Organisations. Inside hotspots and, generally frontline organisations that employ cultural mediators, training on data protection of migrants’ data should be included including on informed consent. Considering the situation they are in, the actors operating on first and second-line reception procedures are dealing with arguably very difficult contexts: facing the need and urgency to provide legal, practical assistance and psychological counselling to people arriving on Italian shores after a difficult and trying journey, issues related to technology and the processing of personal information are clearly overlooked.

This article is also available in Italian.